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Northern Rock"s assets increased "by 20% plus or minus 5% for the last 17 years" (Treasury Committee Report 2008) .
In order to sustain high growth in its assets, the bank changed the structure of its liabilities. In 1999, it indeed adopted an "originate and distribute model" whereby the bank originates loans or purchases them from specialized brokers and transfers them to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SVP) which then packages them into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) for sale to other investors. "Granite", the Northern Rock"s Vehicle was located in Jersey and provided around 50% of Northern Rock funding (securitized notes).
In order to meet its growth funding needs, Northern Rock turned to covered bonds as a new funding strategy in 2004. This type of securitization uses Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) rather than a Special Purpose Vehicle to fund assets and transfer risks. With this new financial method, the bank still holds the assets (as opposed to with SVP) and issues the covered bonds which are secured against them. For the investors, the advantage of such a financial product is linked with the fact that the LLP only comes into force in the case of default of the bank that has issued the covered bonds. So it is a more secure investment.
The counterpart of this rapid and huge growth in wholesale funding was a parallel decrease in the ratio of retail deposits in its funding. Thus, as a proportion of the total liabilities and equity, retail deposits and funds declined from 62.7%in late 1997 to 22.4% at the end of 2006.
Chart 1: Northern Rock: balance sheet growth and liability structure-June 1998 to June 2007.
Source: Bank of England, 2007, Financial Stability Report, October 25, issue 22 For the banking establishments that adopted it, one of the main advantages of the "originate and distribute" model is that in accordance with bank capital regulation, it allows bank to save capital, increase their lending portfolios and thus sustain profitability. Yet, at the same time, securitisation tends to reduce the bank"s incentives to screening and monitoring borrowers. So while securitisation spreads risk, it also has a tendency to raise it. Theoretically, when a bank transfers loans off-balance-sheet, it will assume a loss of reputation if it fails to monitor those loans correctly or if it systematically overstates their quality. Investors who buy nonperforming CDOs will blame the bank that has set up the Special Purpose Vehicle. In fact, this reputation mechanism proves inefficient in offsetting the weakening of the incentives associated with the securitisation of loans.
In its response to the Treasury Committee"s inquiry, the Building Society Association states that by relinquishing its Building Society Status, Northern Rock conduced to the permissive condition that allowed the adoption of its extreme business model. Indeed, the 1986 Building Society Act requires all Building Societies to attract at least 50% of their funding from members (essentially from the retail market). In practice, the wholesale funding of Building Societies in the UK is around 25 to 30 %.
The Northern Rock debacle is therefore entirely due to the extreme business model of a mortgage bank which mainly funded its loan book on the wholesale market rather than from retail deposits and consequently created strong vulnerability to the market"s liquidity squeeze.
Securitisation at Northern Rock funded very fast growth lending. In the first half of 2007 lending went up 31% compared to the same period in 2006. The quality of the Northern Rock"s loan book obviously became a cause of concern -more specifically with regard to the quality of the lending that underpinned its excessive growth in early 2007-which probably contributed to the strong rationing it faced in obtaining wholesale funding in August. The similarity between the business model of the American subprime lenders and that of Northern Rock is of course one of the main reasons for Northern Rock"s collapse. Northern Rock had been a self-designated victim of the subprime crisis and of the subsequent rise in uncertainty which caused an extended period of illiquidity. Indeed, The US subprime crisis was initially a credit shock not a liquidity event. It quickly brought into question the value of a number of asset-backed securities and the related structured-credit products held by a number of financial institutions around the world. The uncertainty was partly due to the inherent structure of securitisation which meant that the holders of assets-backed securities were not party to the information about loan quality and the default rates to which the institutions 4 which originated the loans had access. This uncertainty gave rise to market illiquidity in these financial instruments and then to funding illiquidity because of the way they were being financed. The timing of the liquidity freeze was disastrous for Northern Rock which was low on cash since its last securitisation had occurred in May and it was planning another in
September. Yet, even with better timing, the exceptional length of this liquidity squeeze would have cause funding problems for Northern Rock.
Chart 2: The phases of the crisis.
Source: Bank of England, 2007, Financial Stability Report, October 25, issue 22 Despite several warning signals on the vulnerability of Northern Rock prior to its problems, its aggressive strategy of expanding its market share could be interpreted as a too risky behaviour it resulted in the fall in its share price after the profits warning issued in late June
2007. Yet, the FSA remained passive in the face of the situation. More importantly, the FSA not only ignored these alarming signals, but on 29 June 2007 it granted Northern Rock a Basel 2 waiver which authorized it to adopt an advanced approach to manage its credit risk. In fact, Northern Rock carried out all the stress testing exercices on which the bank and the FSA had agreed in the first half of 2007. Obviously, the possibility that the bank"s funding sources could all dry up at the same time was not one of the considered scenarios… The implementation of advanced approach permitted it to use its own estimation of probability of default, loss given default, exposure at default, and make its own calculation of effective maturity to meet capital minimum standards. The savings in capital provided by this advanced approach allowed Northern Rock to increase its interim dividend by 30.3%.
Crisis management by the Tripartite Authorities
Until late July 2007, Northern Rock remained unaffected by the US subprime problems. Its rapid growth and its dependency on wholesale market funding had little impact on the market"s perceptions of its risk as a counterpart, measured by its CDS spread. As previously observed, while Northern Rock"s credit spread remained stable, its share price experienced a sharp decline from early 2007.
One major surprise in the summer of the 2007 financial turmoil was the amplitude and the rapidity of its transmission to the very "core" of the financial system, i.e. the inter-bank 6 market. Two key events triggered the liquidity crunch and the market disruption of August
2007.
On August 2 nd , it became public that the IKB"s (a German regional bank) financial situation was greatly deteriorated by its US subprime loans" exposure. One week later, on August 9 th , BNP Paribas announced that the quotation of three of its funds needed to be suspended for similar reasons. Following those public disclosures, the inter-bank market came under extreme strain. Northern Rock"s CDS spread began to rise while its share price weakened further.
The global deterioration in credit and money market conditions had been closely monitored by the Tripartite Authorities. Indeed, in the UK, financial stability is to be achieved through a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which establishes a framework for cooperation between the Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA. This MoU sets out the role of each authority and codifies how they have to work together. So, this Tripartite arrangement is based on the division of responsibilities between the Bank of England which, has to contribute to the preservation of the financial system"s stability as a whole., the Financial Services Authority is endowed with the responsibility of authorising and supervising individual banks since the 2000 Financial Services and Markets Act, while the HM Treasury is responsible for the institutional structure of the financial regulatory system.
The main problem with this arrangement is the partition between the supervision (FSA) and the Lender of Last Resort functions (BoE).
According to the Treasury"s Committee Report, between 10 August and mid-September, Northern Rock and the Tripartite Authorities essentially implemented a threefold strategy to alleviate the financial difficulties faced by Northern Rock.
The three options pursued were as follows:
-Northern Rock tried to resolve its liquidity shortage by its own actions in short-term money markets and by securitising its debt -Northern Rock tried to favour a takeover by a major retail bank -Northern Rock received a support facility from the Bank of England guaranteed by the government.
The three options were highly intertwined.
The first option during the period from August to 10 September aimed to resolve the Northern Rock liquidity crisis through the short term money markets. The underlying idea was that the Bank of England"s money market operations might restore liquidity in the short-term markets and thus helped Northern Rock to liquify its assets through securitization. In August, just to alleviate their liquidity problems, banks asked the Bank of England to modify the characteristics of its liquidity injections. They pleaded for central bank"s lending at longer maturities, to avoid the penalty rate and/or an increase of the range in the collateral at which it accepted to lend.
On 12 September 2007, the Bank of England refused these requests. The decision was justified by two main arguments. On the one hand, the money market reform"s objectives had been to give the banking system more flexibility in managing their liquidity and therefore improve the ability of the Bank of England to inject liquidity into the banking system in both normal and stress conditions. So, according to the Bank of England, the banking system should eventually be able to build up liquidity in those markets. More precisely, with the reform of the UK"s money market operations, banks set their own reserve targets each month, at the beginning of the maintenance period. The Bank of England then supplies the reserves requested by the banking system as a whole. The objective is to allow banks to deal with their own day-to-day liquidity needs and to supply in aggregate the banks" demand for reserves so as to keep the overnight interest rate close to the Bank rate set by the Monetary Policy Committee. So, if an individual bank has misjudged its reserve target and finally needs additional liquidity, it can obtain it through standing facilities against eligible collateral at a penalty rate of 1% above the Bank rate. On the other hand, the refusal to agree with the banks" suggestions is justified by the moral hazard generated by such softening of the Bank"s operational liquidity injection conditions.
Consequently, the Bank of England decided first to intervene in the markets by injecting liquidity but only in the overnight interbank market. Meanwhile, the European Central Bank modified the time pattern of its supply of funds to overcome the tensions that then occurred in the euro money market. Furthermore, in response to the unusually high spreads in the euro market between the overnight rate and the ECB"s policy rate, the ECB reinforced its supply of credit for the August maintenance period and thus injected €94.8 billion on 9 August. This option, in association with other operations, allowed the return of overnight rates to the policy rate in the following weeks.
So, contrary to other central banks which adapted their interventions on money markets to the exceptional dysfunctioning of the inter-bank markets caused by a sharp crisis of confidence, the Bank of England did not adopt emergency measures and refused to meet money demands.
Concurrently, a solution involving the private sector was being considered. Thus, between16
August and 10 September, Northern Rock, began discussions with potential acquirers with the assistance of the FSA.
But, as markets" turmoil was going on -for an unspecified period of time-and since Northern
Rock suffered from an enormous lack of liquidity, all the offers received requested financial support. In regard of its official mission to fight against moral hazard, the Tripartite Authorities refused to grant it. For instance, Lloyds TSB, a major retail bank asked the Bank of England for £30 billion loan without penalty rate for two years to take over Northern Rock.
Such a request was justified by the £113.5 billion needed to finance Northern Rock"s balance sheet in consideration of the reputation prejudice which would have generated losses for the potential acquirer (Financial Times, 26 October).
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Among the reasons against financial support to a potential acquirer, the Tripartite Authorities argued that it could not be granted to a private retail bank because it would be considered as State aid which is forbidden under the European Community"s competition law.
Nevertheless, it must be observed that the relative slowness of the takeover process was also an obstacle to the success of the private option. In the takeover process of a quoted bank, it is legal that the authorities in charge of the operation give shareholders enough time so theycan consider various offers. During this period, the bank is exposed to the depositors" suspicion which can worsen its difficulties. This is partly due to the non-existence of a special insolvency regime dedicated to the treatment of weak bank in the UK.
Given the lack of repurchase proposals, Northern Rock ceased its search for a potential acquirer on 10 September.
On 13 September, noting the failure of the two previous rescue options for Northern Rock and considering that there was a risk of contagion to the whole banking system, the Chancellor of The Liquidity Support Facility was closely related to this conception of lender of last resort.
Indeed, it consisted in providing liquidity to Northern Rock against a range of collateral wider than that defined in the standing facilities so the bank could fund its operations during the turmoil period in financial markets, although always at a penalty rate. The penalty rate was justified by moral hazard, as it was supposed to induce a more cautious behaviour in the bank"s management of its liquidity risks in the future. The exact terms on which this financial support was made available, or the method for valuing the collateral were never disclosed.
On 13 September, namely prior to the Bank of England"s official announcement on 14
September, rumours about the emergency liquidity support facility to Northern Rock started to spread in the markets and the BBC commented on the operation. This premature disclosure of the Bank of England"s support stigmatized Northern Rock. Its depositors perceived the emergency liquidity facility as a confession of the bank"s dramatic financial situation and it was not viewed as mere support to a solvent institution facing a liquidity problem. Poor communication worsened the situation and contributed to the bank"s stigmatisation. Indeed, Northern Rock was supposed -as all listed companies-to conform to MAD"s article 6 which provides that member states ensure that issuers of financial instruments inform the public as soon as possible of all inside information of direct concern to them, and that was indeed the case with the emergency liquidity support. Nevertheless, article 6 also states that "an issuer may under his own responsibility delay the public disclosure of inside information…so as not to prejudice his legitimate interest provided that such omission would not be likely to mislead the public and provided that the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of that information". This means that MAD gives flexibility to cope with exceptional circumstances. It was all a matter of interpretation.
In order to stop the bank run, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the provision of a government guarantee on Northern Rock"s deposits on Monday 17 September. This guarantee referred to "all existing deposits at Northern Rock" and was set for the duration of "the current instability in financial markets".
The guarantee"s announcement provided Northern Rock with £20 billion of emergency funding so the bank could meet its liabilities and put an end to the run.
After the bailout, Northern Rock engaged in negotiations with private potential acquirers including JC Flowers, Citigroup and the Virgin group. These negotiations were unsuccessful.
So, on 17 February 2008, the British government decided to nationalize the bank as it officially claimed it felt obliged to protect British taxpayers"interests.
According to Willem Buiter 5 , until Northern Rock"s "nationalization", the Bank of England lent the bank about £25 billion through the Liquidity Support Facility and the government"s total exposure to Northern Rock was at the time of nationalization in the order of £60 billion.
This amount includes the government"s guarantee on all retail deposits but also that on 5 http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2008/02/immoral-hazard-and-northern-rock/ 11 wholesale deposits and on most of the unsecured debt other than subordinated debt and other hybrid capital instruments.
The prudential lessons
Northern Rock has been an archetypal case of the drift of the "originate to distribute" model.
In the extreme case of Northern Rock, for one pound in collected deposits, 3 pounds were lent, so on the liability side, Northern Rock was hugely exposed to the risk of disruption in wholesale markets. Conversely, in the traditional "originate and hold" banking model, banks transform, extend maturity and create liquidity: banks" liabilities are short term and mainly comprise deposits which are repayable at par on demand whereas their assets are longer term and largely non-marketable. This last characteristic is directly linked with the highly private information contents of bank loans compared to market financing 6 . That is why bank assets are widely perceived as more opaque than those of most non-bank firms. In normal times, the association of these two banks" balance-sheet features does not generate problems but if there is a weakening of confidence in the bank"s ability to meet its payments obligations, it can cause a massive withdrawal of deposits (conversion to cash or transfer to other banks) and hence a liquidity problem with the difficulty of selling off assets at a "normal price" (fire sales) and it may also threaten the bank"s solvency. As we already know, deposit insurance constitutes a solution to protect small depositors and avoid bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) .
The shortcomings of the UK Deposit Insurance Scheme
Paradoxically, despite a weak dependence of the Northern Rock financing model on deposits collection, the liquidity problem faced by the bank not only took the form of a drying up of market financing but it also materialized as a bank run, even though the mere existence of a deposit insurance scheme is theoretically sufficient to prevent such a bank run. This episode 
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Prior to 1 October 2007, the FSCS would cover 100% of the first £2000 of deposits but only 90% of the next £33000. Therefore, UK deposit insurance only pays out a maximum of £31700 to any one individual with a protected claim. This co-insurance device was initially adopted after the collapse of BBCI in 1992 7 . The idea that a person insured should share some of the risk is very common in general insurance contracts. The rationale for the mechanism in deposit insurance schemes is to create incentives so depositors monitor their banks. It is therefore conceived as a principle for a reduction in moral hazard on the depositors"part. Nevertheless compared to other creditors, small depositors need stronger protection because a large proportion of them have limited financial means and expertise. If we admit the lack of small depositors" means and skills to efficiently assess the financial strength of their banks, the rationale for co-insurance disappears. Indeed, co-insurance is a mechanism adapted to insurance contracts whereby the individual bearing the deductible can reduce the risk and so the probability to lose money, because of a change in his behaviour.
That is typically not the case for small depositors. In that instance, it was just an incentive to run. Moreover as underlined by A Campbell and D Singh (2007) , co-insurance also presents an added problem, namely that many depositors will not have their claims paid in full and will therefore continue to be creditors of the failed bank. In case of liquidation, these residual depositors"claims will complicate and increase the costs of the winding up process.
In the European Union, the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD) provides the basic framework for the structure of how deposit insurance guarantees have to be designed, it permits but not requires co-insurance of liabilities. Several European countries" deposit insurance schemes integrate co-insurance mechanisms (like Ireland, the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic). The Northern Rock experience pleads in favour of a modification of the DGSD prohibiting co-insurance scheme.
As previously observed, small UK depositors could suffer losses in the value of their deposits (credit losses) because of co-insurance 8 , but they can also suffer liquidity losses because they do not have access to their deposits until the winding up of the judicial process. So, it could take months if not years until the depositors of large failed institutions can be reimbursed. As shown by R Eisenbeis and G Kaufman (2006) , the delayed access to or the freezing of deposit accounts could be assimilated to a forced transformation of demand and short term deposits into longer-term deposits or even bonds. The inability to promptly mobilize deposits to make 7 Initially the level of co-insurance was substantially higher, only 75% of qualifying deposits were guaranteed up to £20000. 8 These credit losses could be transformed into liquidity losses if at the end of the winding up process depositors were fully reimbursed.
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payments constitutes a great source of inefficiency in the payment system. Liquidity losses for depositors may be strongly reduced or even eliminated by appropriate provision in the banks" bankruptcy regime. We have to note that under EU legislation, compensation to depositors should be made within at least 90 days, an extension to 6 months is tolerated in exceptional circumstances. So, once again DGSD could be analysed as insufficiently constraining.
Even with a high level of compensation and without co-insurance, it would still be rational for depositors to withdraw their deposits from a financial distressed bank if there were strong uncertainty about repayment delays.
The funding model of the UK Deposit Insurance Scheme also has to be discussed. Indeed, an inadequate funding system can lead to increased delays in resolving failed banks and to a loss of credibility in the deposit Insurance Arrangements. There are two polar cases for funding arrangements: ex ante or ex post funding 9 . Ex -post or "pay as you go" funding requires member banks to pay premiums only after a failure. The motivation for such a funding device is to stimulate inter-bank monitoring. Nevertheless it presents strong disadvantages: it limits the ability of the Deposit Insurance to promptly pay out insured depositors and it is procyclical because it levies contributions precisely at the time when banks experience a period of financial distress and suffer tighter capital constraints. Moreover, failed banks do not contribute to the cost of deposit insurance. On the contrary, ex-ante funding refers to the accumulation of reserve prior to the distress episode 10 . It could be designed in such a way so as to smooth out the amount of premiums paid by banks over the course of the business cycle and could thus alleviate the pro-cyclical problems previously underlined. Furthermore, all the member banks participate to the funding, including those that subsequently fail. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme has been referred to as ex-post funding. During the course of the Treasury Committee inquiry (2008) 11 , the British Bankers" Association (BBA) and the Building Societies" Association (BSA) recognised that the FSCS was designed to deal with losses of up to £4 billion. Therefore, if a bank or Building Society were to fail and the potential losses to depositors exceeded £4 billion, the government would need to fund the shortfall to prevent net losses to depositors. So, there was a clear recognition from these two professional Associations that the risk of large scale bank failure was underwritten by the taxpayers and not by the banking community through deposit insurance schemes.
14 So the UK Deposit Insurance Arrangement cumulated the incentive for bank runs: coinsurance, liquidity losses due to long reimbursement delays and ex-post funding which reinforce the payout delays. Such shortcomings are not specific to the UK, they are also permitted by the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive. So the lessons of the Northern Rock"s experience have to be enlarged to the E.U. Deposit Protection legislation which must reinforce its requirements on national Schemes.
The arguments in favour of a special bank insolvency regime
Bank failures are different from that of other companies in many important aspects that can be mobilized to justify the exemption of banks from general corporate insolvency law and their subjection to administrative insolvency proceedings under the control of regulators.
Empirically, bank liquidations are rare (except for small banks) compared to the frequency of bank reorganization. This may be interpreted as an evident sign of the specificity of the banks" bankruptcy process.
A large proportion of the arguments in favour of a special treatment of banks in insolvency proceedings deals with the justification for stronger regulation in the banking sector compared to other commercial or industrial sectors. In some ways, banks and building societies can be assimilated to utility providers and the UK already has special administration regimes for the energy, water and railway industries. These ensure that crucial services to customers remain secure and continuous in the event that company providing those services becomes insolvent.
Why are banks special and may need a special insolvency regime?
-Bank deposits collectively comprise the largest share of the country"s money supply and its primary exchange medium. So, banks" liabilities are the most usual medium of exchange.
-Banks perform financial services that are fundamental to the smooth functioning of the economy such as the extension of credit especially to those agents who cannot find alternative funding sources (households, small and medium companies etc.), which includes deposits taking and payment processing. Banks remain the primary source of liquidity for most financial and non-financial institutions. So, potentially, bank failures can cause credit rationing, a substantial reduction in economic activity and eventually, a spiral of commercial failures in the worst cases. Thus, the knock-on effect does not only disturb the financial system through exposure and the informational channel but also the commercial and industrial sectors as well, through the credit channel.
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-Bank insolvency may entail a risk to the entire economic and financial system by a propagation process from the defaulting bank"s counterparties or by the informational channel. The exposure channel relates to the potentiality of "domino effects" through real exposure in interbank markets and/or in payment systems, whereas the informational channel has to do with the lack of information on the mutual exposure of banks and on the type of shocks affecting banks (idiosyncratic or systematic) which can generate contagious withdrawals by non-informed depositors.
The arguments previously presented are traditionally used both to justify stricter regulation for banks compared to other companies and to advocate a special bank insolvency regime.
Nevertheless, there are also other specific arguments calling for special treatment.
The insolvency concept is quite different for banks compared to other companies because the regulator is vested with a central role in the insolvency proceedings. Different reasons can explain this specificity:
-First, under general insolvency law, the trigger point for intervention is the default of the debtor"s institutions on their liabilities on due date. Because of banks" balancesheet specificity, such inability to meet a short-term liability is not necessary a proof of insolvency but can simply result from a temporary shortage of liquidity. By contrast, and still because of the peculiarity of its balance-sheet which provides an ongoing source of cash flow, a bank experiencing financial difficulties can continue to honour the payments of its debts in a financial system endowed with a well-designed deposit insurance even though the bank may be potentially insolvent. As they are subject to the special regulations that condition their operations, banks benefit from special proceedings which define their viability. The bank supervisor assesses the adequacy of the bank"s capital, he judges the quality of its assets and it is his prerogative to determine the point of insolvency. As remarked by Eva Hüpkes (2003):
"a bank is insolvent when the supervisor says it"s insolvent!". As per most general corporate bankruptcy codes, bankruptcy may be initiated either by a minimum number of creditors whose claims are in default or by the firm itself in anticipation of default.
The proceedings differ for banks. Compared to the general insolvency regime, bank insolvency procedures give a less active role to creditors" committees and insolvency judges but grant a key role to the supervisor. If the supervisor judges that the bank"s capital is impaired, he can intervene in a pre-emptive way and constrain the bank"s activities with a view to preventing insolvency. These pre-insolvency interventions are part of the prudential policy that can mobilize a large set of tools, ranging from the informal to the more intrusive. So, operationally, there is some sort of continuum between regular prudential policy and bank insolvency proceedings.
-The main objectives of a general corporate bankruptcy law is to find solutions to collective action problems like coordinating the debt collection efforts of multiple creditors to maximize overall recovery value and/or maximizing the realized value of the bankrupt firm"s assets and resolving the creditors" claims in an orderly and collective manner. By contrast, even though these objectives may exist in the case of a bank failure, the principal goal of the bank bankruptcy procedure is to preserve the stability of the financial sector as a whole and to avoid systemic problems. So, in addition to private creditors, debtors and stockholders" interests, a bank insolvency law has to take account of public interest. The bank insolvency regime is concerned These exemptions seem to conflict with the objective of fairness to all creditors but are consistent with the preservation of financial stability. Similarly, the rules that underlie the orderly and smooth functioning of the payment and settlement systems, which are based on the finality and irrevocability of payments even in the case of a bank failure could be interpreted as conflicting with the rules structuring corporate insolvency laws.
The shortcomings of the legal British device for weak banks

17
The UK"s financial safety net relies upon general takeover and bankruptcy laws in its dealing with weak banks. There is no a specific mechanism for intervening pre-emptively when a bank is in trouble and subsequently ensure the continuation of critical banking functions -like access to the checking account and payment systems. This has been a serious disadvantage in the management of the crisis.
Because of the previously underlined specificities of bank failure, the "closed bank" resolution option has been considered generally unacceptable by leading authorities around the world, for large or multiple bank failures. Despite a number of operational differences, these proposals have quite a few similar steps in common.
1) Prompt legal closure to avoid credit losses and prompt customer access to accounts.
To avoid liquidity losses, the authorities take control of the insolvent bank 12 .
12 . In the case of Northern Rock, the nationalization was decided too late to alleviate the cost of the resolution to taxpayers. There has been a five-months delay in the search of a private sector"s buyer. Eventually, when it noticed that the two private sector proposals (from Virgin group and from the bank"s management) failed to offer sufficient value to British taxpayers, the UK government decided to put Northern Rock into temporary public ownership.
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2) A prompt estimate of recovery values and assignment of credit losses ("haircut") to uninsured bank claimants when the bank is insolvent. The idea is to promptly divide creditors claims into a portion that will remain frozen and dedicated to the absorption of losses and a portion that will be made rapidly available to insured creditors as soon as the bank reopens. This step aims to enhance market discipline.
3) The quick sale or bridging of insolvent bank and prompt reopening (next workday)
particularly for larger banks with full access to bank services for insured depositors and borrowers. institutions subject to PCA appeared on one or more regulatory watch list prior to or concurrent with a decline in its capital category, 12 of the 18 institutions experienced a decline in their CAMELS ratings prior to or concurrent with becoming undercapitalized.
CAMELS ratings are a key product of regulators" on site monitoring. They measure an institution"s performance in six areas: capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity 13 Under section 38 regulators must take increasingly severe supervisory actions as an institution"s capital level deteriorates but it also authorizes several non-capital based supervisory actions. 14 US GAO Report to Congressional Committees ( Quantitative regulations usually aim to maintain certain liquidity indicators above minimum regulatory thresholds, whereas qualitative approaches focus more on the bank"s internal controls and reporting practices. Mixed requirements mobilize both types of approaches.
More precisely, quantitative liquidity regulations can include stock-based approaches, mismatch based and hybrid approaches. Stock-based approaches require the bank to hold a stock of highly liquid assets that are immediately convertible into cash in all market conditions. This stock is weighed against total assets or some measure of liquidity risk. From a regulatory perspective the higher such quantitative liquidity requirements, the stronger the bank"s resilience to severe liquidity shocks. Moreover, these stock-based liquidity regulations make it easier to assess the vulnerability of an individual bank to a liquidity shortage, especially when compared with other banks. Mismatch-based regulations take account of a broader time dimension that assesses a bank"s liquidity level by focusing on the predicted net cash position through time. This approach is consistent with banks" risk management practices which widely use mismatch analysis as a metric to assess their level of liquidity risk 15 . More sophisticated quantitative models measure and manage liquidity risk. There are comparable to those used for measuring and managing market risk, such as liquidity at risk (LaR) but they are not widely used at present. Hybrid approaches combine both stock and mismatch approaches.
C Goodhart (2008) showed the overlap between the two components of bank liquidity management -maturity transformation and the inherent liquidity of a bank"s assets. The more liquid and instantly sellable-without significant loss of value under any market conditions-a bank"s assets, the fewer worries for the bank about maturity transformation. Likewise, the lower the maturity transformation, the fewer worries for the bank about the market risk on its assets since it can hold them until maturity and overcome market disturbances. Moreover, the bank"s vulnerability to a drying-up of market liquidity hugely depends on the bank"s business model. These remarks plead in favour of fairly flexible liquidity requirements rather than uniform liquidity regulation with an activation of the discretionary power of the regulator through pillar 2. In particular, the liquidity requirements should be related to the bank"s solvency. This provision is similar to the prompt corrective action spirit in the pre-announced progressiveness of the regulatory constraints. When a bank is downgraded to a lower level of capital zone, its liquidity requirements have to be reinforced. The bank"s business model must also be taken into account for the determination of its liquidity requirements. From a wider macro-prudential perspective exposure, it is necessary go beyond that stage and increase the bank"s liquidity requirement in accordance with its specific exposure to several types of macroeconomic shocks. The emergency liquidity assistance provided by the central bank in case of a systemic liquidity squeeze lies behind the rationale for this measure. It could be interpreted as implicit pricing or as some sort of counterpart for the central bank"s protection whose aim is to limit the moral hazard induced by central liquidity insurance.
15 See the Joint Forum Report, (2006) , "The management of liquidity risk in financial groups".
Concluding remarks
The 
